While the decisive 'metaphysical', or 'religious', turn in Comte's intellectual biography -triggered by his relationship with Clotilde de Vaux -has gone down as a 'bizarre episode' in the history of the social sciences (Lepenies, 1988: 34), the systematic impact of his theory of sexual difference on his conception of sociology was consistently ignored. Not only does this omission reveal of a selective dealing with Comte's work, but it also leaves in the dark the embattled terrain on which he devised his theories. While Comte's sociophysiological foundation of sexual hierarchy was indeed to be engrained in emerging social
political thought of earlier centuries, in particular, the Enlightenment and Scottish moral philosophy. But the Terror and the stark divisions in the wake of the French Revolution demanded a novel explanation of the significance of these violent events; new interpretations of social change and stability were required. From the very beginning, authors who were concerned with societal organization in this vein linked the quest for theories about the 'social bond' in modern society with assumptions about the 'sexual bond' (Fraisse, 1992: 49) . 2 Auguste Comte is a particularly evident case in point: In no respect did the 'lamentable mental anarchy' of contemporary society seem more striking to him than in the attempts to claim the affranchisment of women. Such claims, he argued in 1843, contradicted the hierarchical order of the sexes as it was based in physiology and functional to societal order and were worth no more than unscientific sentimentalities, alien to the positive spirit of the new human sciences (Comte in Mill, 1899: 245) . They bypassed what he believed to be the female mission, namely to alleviate the moral ravages of the present on the grounds of her domestic nature and her instinctive distaste for all things modern. Charged with the dissemination of the secular positivistic religion that Comte had devised to establish social cohesion in a perceived anarchistic society, women should act as a veritable bulwark against the excesses and anomalies of social change.
While the decisive 'metaphysical', or 'religious', turn in Comte's intellectual biography -triggered by his relationship with Clotilde de Vaux -has gone down as a 'bizarre episode' in the history of the social sciences (Lepenies, 1988: 34) , the systematic impact of his theory of sexual difference on his conception of sociology was consistently ignored. Not only does this omission reveal of a selective dealing with Comte's work, but it also leaves in the dark the embattled terrain on which he devised his theories. While Comte's sociophysiological foundation of sexual hierarchy was indeed to be engrained in emerging social theory, it was highly contested at the time -not only by John Stuart Mill whose breaking with Comte over the woman's question is well known, but also by an author who opposed Comte with clearly sociological arguments: Jenny P. d'Héricourt.
If, as his biographers tell us, Auguste Comte had his writing desk faced towards a mirror and 'was always looking at himself' while writing (Lepenies, 1988: 46) , d'Héricourt must have worked at an open window. Her thinking was shot through with an empirical approach to contemporary society that served as the starting point, reference and correcting force for her theoretical work. From that perspective she criticized Comte's blueprint for social order:
It is said, sir, that you no longer read. Indeed, I have noticed this, for you do not appear to know anything about the mental and material condition of the various members of our French society, in particular as far as my sex is concerned. (D'Héricourt, 1855: 59) For a long time now, d'Héricourt observed, women had been involved in the social change brought about by the Enlightenment, the Revolution and industrialization, leading to their becoming part of modern society. And this, she contended, was not, as Comte would have it, a sign of social anarchy, but the positive achievement of post-revolutionary society. Those who did not take this fact into account when theorizing on modernity, those who denied its legitimacy and tried to bring it to a halt by devising opposed normative prescriptions, aimed at nothing less than the 'social annihilation of woman' (l'annihilation sociale de la femme) (d'Héricourt, 1860a: I, 166) . To prove the empirical falseness, the political injustice and the conceptual defectiveness inherent to this theoretical maneuver was the goal d'Héricourt set herself, devising her work as a 'response to the modern innovators' and calling it a 'philosophical theory of rights ' (d'Héricourt, 1860a: I, 8) .
Jenny P. d'Héricourt is today a little-known thinker with neither institutional nor academic legitimacy at her time. The consideration her work has been afforded posthumously is limited to her advocacy of women's emancipation and the emancipation of the working classes.
Yet, it was precisely her concern with women's relationship to modernity and her critique of contemporary theories of sexual difference that steered d'Héricourt's thinking along the sociological tracks that her opponents had left when devoting themselves to the creation of various ontologies of sexual difference. However, this very concern entailed her being placed exclusively in the history of feminism and catapulted her out of the tradition building efforts in sociology to come. Thus, her story is revealing not just as to the history of social thought but also as to mistaken demarcations that organize historiographic work in 19 th century intellectual history by setting apart the history of feminist thought from the one of emerging human and social science disciplines. Several of the adversaries of the cause which I defend, have carried the discussion into the domain of science, and have not shrunk before the nudity of biological laws and anatomical details. I praise them for it; the body being respectable, there is no indecency in speaking of the laws which govern it; but as it would be an inconsistency on my part to believe that blamable in myself which I approve in them, you will not be surprised that I follow them on the ground which they have chosen, persuaded that Science, the chaste daughter of Thought, can no more loose her chastity under the pen of a pure woman In his books, L'Amour (1859) and La femme (1860), the Romantic historian, Jules Michelet (1798-1874), had represented woman as being, due to her menstrual cycle, weak, wounded and diseased, and thus psychologically volatile. D'Héricourt counters that, in principle, no physiological function could ever be morbid, and hence menstruation could not be described as a disease. In individual cases, in particular in the upper classes, there could be morbid phenomena, but they were exceptions. Therefore, in her view, Michelet was violating the principles of rational thinking by concluding general rules from a few exceptions, constructing imaginary laws and making these the starting point of his theorizing (d'Héricourt, 1860: 17-32 and 1860a: I, 91-109).
As is well known, Auguste Comte (1798-1857), too, claimed to rely on biology and physiology when he propagated a hierarchical segregation between men and women as the basis of societal order which he believed discernible by means of phrenology and the 'moral physiology' of the Montpellier school (Comte in Mill, 1899: 32; Honegger, 1991 ). Women's brain structure, he argued, enabled them to perform emotional, but not intellectual or productive functions. Referring to phrenology, for her part, d'Héricourt countered this argument:
Since you believe in Gall and Spurzheim, you know that the encephalon of the two sexes is alike, that it is modifiable in both, that all education is founded on this modificability; why has it never occurred to you that if man en masse is more rational than woman, it is because education, laws and custom have developed in him the anterior lobes of the brain; while in woman, education, laws, and custom develop especially the posterior lobes of this organ; and why, having established these facts, have you not been led to conclude that, since organs are developed only in consequence of the excitants applied to them, it is probable that man and woman, subjected to the same cerebral excitants, would be developed in the same manner, with the shades of difference peculiar to each individuality; and that for woman to be developed harmoniously under her three aspects, she must manifest herself socially under three aspects? (D'Héricourt, 1860b: 132-133 and 1860a: I, 124-125) Contrary to Comte, d'Héricourt stressed the plasticity of the human brain. As the natural design of human beings is capable of being molded, a non-deterministic Nature is the starting point for collective or individual development which leads to a 'second nature ' (d'Héricourt, 1860a: 225) acquired through habitualization within a social milieu and under a specific educational influence. Hence, there can be no biological justification for women's exclusion from production and intellectual endeavors:
Be sure, sir, […] in the presence of the physiology of the brain, all theories of classification fall to the ground: before the nervous system, women are the equals of men:
they can be their inferiors only before muscular supremacy, attacked by the invention of powder, and about to be reduced to dust by the triumph of mechanism. (D'Héricourt, 1860b: 133 and 1860a: I, 125)
Whatever different features women and men expose in their faculties, those are, according to d'Héricourt's reasoning, progressively products of social norms. In arguing so, she not only attacked Comte's recourse to a deterministic Nature, but she also undermined his whole theoretical system: Reducing the woman's question to a matter of biology (and assigning it to 'social statics' which he deemed only a prerequisite for 'social dynamics' as the proper domain of sociology), he declared it to be, at the same time and in a remarkable yet not atypical inversion, 'one of the most fundamental questions of sociology' (Comte in Mill, 1899: 245) . The argument goes as follows: Due to their emotional and domestic nature, women are capable of stimulating, within the confines of the family, the underdeveloped 'social instinct' of men and children. Only through this 'moral refinement' would men learn to restrain personality -equated with egoism -in favor of sociability -equated with altruism -in order thus to acquire the civic spirit that would enable them to act outside the home (Comte, 1891: 289-90) . Whereas, by way of this logic, Comte conferred upon women the responsibility of making sociability possible, he kept them apart from society: They are assigned, by nature and function, to the family which is a counterpart to society because it binds its members in only a rudimentary specialization of labor.
At the same time, however, Comte propagated the family as a model for the hierarchical organization in a positivistic society since in the family arose women's subordination to men and the one of the younger to the older (Comte, 1975: lesson 50) .
'Double-bound' he conceived both family's relationship to society -as a counterpart and a model -and women's status -as 'moral missionaries' charged with the task of solving society's most urgent problems and as a-social beings subject to men's political control. Both the development of altruism and the establishment of hierarchy Comte believed necessary to create and organize order in a society built upon modern forms of production which threatened to get out of control by exaggerating specialization. Proudhon's statements were, indeed, characterized by marked brutality. Instead of emancipating women, he suggested one would better lock them up. Since the difference between the sexes in the human being corresponds to the difference between species, he argued, woman can only ever be a complement to man: 'housewife or courtesan', according to his now famous saying. Therefore, she can become neither a contracting partner nor a citizen nor a bearer of public office which, Proudhon maintains, follows from the fact that woman lacks the capacity to produce germs and thus ideas. their modes of behavior and activities. This justifies hierarchy, based on the principle that the sex more valuable for the evolution of the species is placed above the other. As can be seen in his hairiness and deep breathing, man is closer to animality and, hence, an underdeveloped variant of woman, standing between her and the species of great apes. Woman, on her side, is the creator and custodian of the species since she carrys the human germ inside her, whereas it is uncertain whether man is indispensable for procreation. In any case, human science will make his procreative performance superfluous in the future. 7 In analogy to the human germ, women also bear the germ of intellectuality and morality. They are careful observers, whereas men construct paradoxes and loose their senses in the depths of metaphysics. They are, by their gentleness, morally superior to the brutal and insensitive man. While the muscular man did fulfill a civilizing task, humanity's destiny now lies beyond the mere subjection of Nature and, consequently, women must take on the directing of human affairs.
rd Scenario:
Every classification of the human species is a subjective creation and an illusion of the mind. In truth, Nature hates repetition and, hence, no human being resembles another. Since the diversity of humanity does not bear classification, the individuality of every human being must be respected and the same rights granted to all of them. Human order can only arise from competition between free, individual faculties, whereas an artificial order, based on classifications, constitutes disorder as it leads to cruelty, oppressing those who do not correspond to their assumed type, or compelling them to be hypocrites. The mania for classification has borne bitter fruits as the division of humanity into castes, classes and sexes has largely caused the misery contemporary society is afflicted with.
4
th Scenario: Female and male organisms are different in all their aspects. Woman has more sensitive nerves, fewer compact bones, weaker muscles etc. Intellectual and moral differences correspond to these organic ones: their sensitive nervous system makes women more susceptible to impressions, physical weakness gives rise to both cunning behavior and a need for protection, and motherhood ensures that they will be hostile to destruction. Since women think in concrete terms and make keen observations, they are particularly suited to scientific and philosophical activity: They correct the male drive for abstraction, thus dispelling ontologies, and they are aware that generalizations are inadmissible. Hence, a genuine philosophy and a true science of the human being will bear the mark of both sexes. The same holds true for the production of goods, medicine, law, public administration and politics. Precisely because the sexes are different, women's participation is needed in all areas.
D'Héricourt's four scenarios take up contemporary theories of sexual difference, representing them as a pattern in the logic of which all possible interpretations or ideas can be propounded. She disagrees with all four theories proposed, being convinced neither of the identity of the sexes nor of the superiority of one, nor of the absence of sexual difference, nor of complementary sex characters. 8 In a Kantian vein, d'Héricourt questions what all these theories must presuppose, i.e. that the essence of a pre-social difference between the sexes is amenable to understanding. As this is not possible, theorizing about sexual difference can take as its starting point only actual differences between men and women, thus confusing that which is the product of education and power relations with a difference that is stated as being beyond the social. And this holds true not only for sex, but applies to all 'classification of the human species, whether in castes, in classes, or in sexes' (d'Héricourt, 1860b: 244 and 1860a: II, 123). However, she does not discard the very idea of sexual difference:
We do not give a classification, because we neither have nor can have one; the elements for its establishment are lacking. A biological deduction permits us to affirm that such a one exists; but it is impossible to disengage its law in the present surroundings; the veritable feminine stamp will be known only after one or two centuries of like education We observe concrete phenomena, compare them and establish similarities or differences.
Our faculty for abstraction enables us to detect individual similarities, and, from them, we construct a phenomenon that only exists in the imagination, that one calls a species, functional to society, and give rise to a system of specialized production that connects individuals through relationships of exchange and cooperation: 'it is our duty to put ourselves in a position which enables us to perform a function that brings benefit to ourselves and others, and makes the exchanging of services possible.' (D'Héricourt, 1860a: II, 238) Admittedly, to this form of structural integration, d'Héricourt does not apply the term 'division of labor' as Durkheim will do later; yet, she establishes a nexus of statements that falls under this rubric. And her emphasis clearly rests, as does Durkheim's -at least in his optimistic
Division of Labor 10 -on the individualizing and integrating effects of differentiation through the division of labor. For Durkheim, division of labor is the source of 'organic solidarity' which, in contrast to 'mechanical solidarity', does not integrate people who are alike, but people who are different. It becomes possible 'if each one of us has a sphere of action that is peculiarly our own, and consequently a personality' (Durkheim, 1984: 85) . The more divided labor and the more personalized activities are, according to Durkheim's thesis, the stronger will be the social Division of labor, as Durkheim was to go on to argue, cannot be reduced to its economic dimension, but has, moreover, a 'moral character, since needs for order, harmony and social solidarity are generally reckoned to be moral ones' (Durkheim, 1984: 24) . Similarly, in d'Héricourt's thinking, the division of labor lays the ground not only for structural but also for moral integration in that it sets up cooperative relationships which she conceives as relations of mutual rights and duties: Society is an organized ensemble of human beings who associate in order to grant each other the guarantee of exercising their individual Right, to ease the exercise of Duty, to exchange goods in equitable way, and to cooperate in the progressive realization of humanity's destiny. (D'Héricourt, 1860a: II, 22) This is why women fall victim to 'social annihilation', if the most fundamental of all rights and the most fundamental of all duties are denied them, i.e. the right to determine their actions on the basis of their individual talents, and the duty of fulfilling a useful function that benefits others.
For this reason, performing a function according to individual -and not sexually stereotypedaptitude, is, as the starting point of structural and moral integration, the primary route to the emancipation of women: they could 'only be affranchised through labor ' (d'Héricourt, 1860b: 175 and 1860a: II, 26).
As becomes clear in this argument, mutual rights and duties bind the individual not only to other individuals but also to society as a whole since not only does the performance of functions serve the satisfaction of other individuals' needs, but it also benefit society. All aptitudes that make up an individual, d'Héricourt contends, are 'entitled to be performed because all of them are necessary to achieve the harmony of the whole' -and this 'whole' can be understood as the whole personality as well as the whole of society to which the harmonious personality contributes (d'Héricourt, 1860a: II, 15) . Hence, society, for its own sake, owes its members the right to their individuality because 'the enjoyment of the individual right guarantees social progress, since that progress depends on the free unfolding of faculties, and those faculties can only develop in a context of liberty ' (d'Héricourt, 1860a: II, 14-15) .
Arguing that a social existence consists of both individualization and incorporation into chapter 'Summary of the proposed reforms').
As all human beings are as such entitled to natural, civil, economic and political rights, those rights cannot be refused, or bestowed, in fact. Rather, they are 'recognized' on certain conditions, namely 'when we are in a condition to exercise and to demand it; and we prove that guarantee cohesion between the sexes and to protect man from anomic tendencies, second, the creation of professional associations intended to ensure cohesion among men (Durkheim, 1922; Marshall, 2002; Lehmann, 1991; Roth, 1989/90) .
D'Héricourt challenged the concept of double stratification from its very outset, putting forward an interpretation of integration in modern societies that does not come to a halt at the demarcation drawn by 'sex'. No individual should have to sacrifice their individuality to a sex stereotype, and no society, for its own sake, may depend on such a sacrifice in order to secure cohesion. From this perspective there arose the theoretical challenge of conceptualizing the relationship between the individual and society in a non-reductionist way. In conceiving this problem lies what deserves to be called d'Héricourt's classic contribution to sociological thought. Classic it can be considered as for the radicalism with which she put this core problem of sociology: without taking recourse to sexual stratification. Contrary to her fellow social theorists up to the last third of the 20 th century, she saw cohesion in a differentiated society as being guaranteed when all members, regardless of their sex, can realize their individuality.
Consequently, as long as women are subsumed under a sex type and as long as their social existence is confined to the family, society's full potential for integration will remain unused.
By thus substantiating the feminist claim for emancipation not only on the basis of a philosophy of equality but also on the basis of social theory, d'Héricourt could postulate equal status as an ethical requirement and as a social necessity. Thereby, she extended the feminist discourse by adding a sociological dimension to it, while, at the same time, freeing sociological discourse from its limitations brought about by ontologies of sexual difference and the concept of double stratification that precluded the posing of sociology's core problem in its most radical
form.
Yet, d'Héricourt's version of conceptualizing of social cohesion has not been handed down continuously in social theory. Thus, not only has a sociological question been posed only half-heartedly, but also, following d'Héricourt, a part of social reality has become a taboo: The 'social annihilation' she criticized was a matter of theory, institutions, mores and laws -it did, however, not correspond to the intellectual and economic transformations which, indeed, did involve women:
Since woman is no longer engrossed in the household and the care of children, but, on the contrary, has an ever growing proportion of the production of the national and individual wealth, it is self-evident that she needs liberty and independence, and that she must have an entirely different position in the family and in affairs outside the home from that of the past. (D'Héricourt, 1860a: II, 273) In d'Héricourt's view, not the female claims for emancipation did constitute anarchy, as Comte would have it. But the discrepancy between actual capacities and activities of women, on the one hand, and institutions and ideas that preserved what was believed to be a pre-modern order of the sexes, on the other hand, generated a social pathology -hence the need for reform. And this need d'Héricourt states with a sense of urgency: 'I claim the rights of woman', she wrote, 'because the progress of enlightenment, in which woman participates, has transformed her in social power, and because this new power produces evil in default of the good which it is not permitted to do' (D'Héricourt, 1860b: X and 1860a: I, 7). While we leave it to historical interpretation to judge the accuracy of this prognosis, we would like to argue that its formulation exposes, once again, the embattled nature of the terrain on which theories on modern society emerged. Most visibly embattled they were to an extent that raises a provocative question: Should we consider the longlasting theorizing of women's adversity to modernity and men's exclusive capacity to embody the modern subject not just as a discourse that triumphed over its external critics but as a reaction to internal challenges that have become invisible only retrospectively because they were, in processes of canonization, lost or delegitimized?
